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It is by now common knowledge that ownersh ip of a professional 
sports team carries with it certain tax advantages. In a recent paper, 
Okner ( 3 ) has discussed the nature of these advantages. The purpose 
of the present paper is to explore the implications of such tax advantages 
for the cash flow position of an owner of a sports team, and for the 
market price of the team, A simplified model of valuation of a team is 
qescribed, and the conclusions derived from this model are compared 
,with empirical observations concerning market prices of sports teams. 
The potentialities of special tax treatment from ownership of 
a sports team were apparently first discovered by Bill Veeck ln 1959 
when he was in the process of purchasing the Chicago White Sox ( 5, 6 ) ,
As i t  turned out, however, Veeck was not able to acquire a sufficiently 
large fraction of the White Sox' stock to actually take advantage of his 
discovery. Since that time, various IR S rulings have clarified the tax 
advantage, and owners of sports teams have n1ade widespread use of 
the tax benefits from ownership . At the present time, the attitude of 
the IR S is changing, and it might well be the case that the era of special 
tax advantages is near its end, so far as professional sports is concerned. 
To explain the tax advantages associated with ownership of a 
sports team, some comments are necessary concerning the balance sheet 
of the team . The assets of any sports team consist largely of intangibles, 
with tangible assets representing only a negligible fraction of the team's 
book value. Intangible assets of a team 'include the team's league 
franchise; providing exclusive rights to the exhibition of league games 
within a specified geographic area (generally defined in terms of a 
twenty- five to seventy- five mile radius about the home stadium of the 
team); an equal sharing with other league teams in the proceeds of 
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the league 1 s national TV contract; an equal sharing with other league 
teams in entry fees paid to the league by expansion teams; participation 
in the annual league draft of newly recruited players; and protection 
within the league of the team's rights to "reserved " players, that is, 
players regarded as the team's property so far as the league is concerned. 
In contrast, for most sports teams, tangible assets are represented 
only by office furniture and supplies, together with uniforms and other 
playing equipment. 
When a sports team is purchased, the purchase price becomes 
the measure of the total value of the tangible and intangible assets held 
by the team. At time of purchase, the new owner makes an assignment 
of this purchase price among the various assets of the team . For tangible 
assets, valuation is no particular problem, since the accounting rule 
"lower of cost (less depreciation) or market " can be applied in a straight­
forward manner. But for the intangible assets, there are real d ifficulties 
in arriving at non- arbitrary valuations of individual intangible assets, 
because of the "joint product " nature of these assets.· It is in the _valuation 
of the intangible as sets of the team that tax advantages arise. 
Current IR S rulings hold that the player contracts held by a 
team at time of purchase can be treated as depreciable assets, which 
can be wr \tten off over the expected playing lifetime of the players. 
Other intangible assets such as the franchise, TV contract, etc. , have 
generally been regarded by the IR S as non-depreciable, It should also 
be pointed out that the IR S permits a team to write off as current expenses 
certain of the costs associated with replacing players, such as losses 
of minor league affiliates, training camps, scouting activities, etc. 
Bonuses paid to drafted players and payments made in purchase of 
players from other teams must be capitalized and written off over the 
expected playing lifetimes of such players. 
Depreciation of player contracts held by the team at time of 
purchase is thus a non-cash cost of the team that reduces the team's 
taxable income over the period during which such player contracts are 
being written off. Qnce the player contracts have been completely 
depreciated, there are no special tax advantages from ownership of the 
team. But the owner is now free to sell the. team to someone else, who 
* can now go through the same process. In this sense, the tax benefits 
�' At time of sale, the existing owner pays capital gains tax on the 
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difference between the sales price of the team and the cost bas.is of the 
assets of the team (for player contracts, original value less accumulated 
depreciation). In addition, the existing owner must pay ordinary income 
taxes on any recapture of excess depreciation, that is, on the difference 
between the purchase price assigned to any player contract and its book 
value. Hence, at time of sale, the incentives work towards as low a 
valuation as possible for player contracts on the part of the seller, and 
as high a valuation as possible to player contracts on the part of the buyer. 
Both of these assigmnents, of course, are subject to IR S scrutiny, but in 
practice it appears that the IR S has been willing to accept different 
valuations by buyers and seilers. See Sporting News (August 17, 1974). 
from team ownership are perpetual. 
Clearly there are important incentives present for the purchaser 
of a sports team to assign as large a value as possible to the playing 
contracts owned by a tearn, and as low a value as possible to the non­
depreciable intangible assets of the team. This is reflected in the usual 
practice with respect to expansion teams, where the entry fee charged 
the team is typically d ivided between a nominal sum charged for the 
franchise, with the great bulk of the purchase price assigned to the 
players whose contracts are purchased by the expansion team from 
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existing teams in the league. For example, when Atlanta was admitted 
to the N FL for the 1966 season, the entry fee was $8, 500, 000 - - $50, 000 
for the NFL franchise, and $8, 450, 000 for the forty-two players Atlanta 
was permitted to draft from the rosters of the fourteen N FL teams. 
The implicit value of $200, 000 plus per drafted player applied to individuals 
who must be regarded as somewhat marginal, since each N FL team 
was permitted to exempt twenty- nine of the forty- two players on its 
roster from the Atlanta draft. Beyond this, Atlanta could draft at most 
three players from any one N FL team. 
This raises the question of the "true" value that should be 
assigned to any given player contract owned by a team. From the 
economist's point of view, such a contract is worth the discounted present 
value of profits that accrue to the owner of the contract. Thus if a given 
player has an expected playing lifetime of T years, if he adds MRt dollars 
to revenue in year t, and if his salary in year t is wt, then the value, V, 
of the contract at time zero is given by 
v 
where d is the rate of discount. 
(Strictly speaking, the appropriate value for MRt is that 
associated with the team in the league that has the highest such value 
so far as the player is concerned, since the team owning the contract 
maximizes profits from ownership of the contract by selling it to the 
team with the highest MRt' assuming that the market for player contracts 
operates competitively. ) 
In principle at least, marg inal revenue (MRt) can be calculated 
on a player by player basis to determine for any team what the "true" 
value of its holdings of player contracts is. Actual calculations have been 
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made· for baseball by Scully ( 4 ), and for certain basketball players by 
Noll ( 2 · ) , For sports like football where team performance rather than 
individual performance is the dominat ing feature of the game, calculations 
of marginal revenues of individual players are particularly difficult. 
Of course, the best measure of values of player contracts would 
be market prices at which contracts exchange. Data on sales prices of 
individual player contracts are virtually non- existant for any of the major 
sports leagues. Furthermore, in particular the N FL has the peculiar 
characteristic that apparently no cash sales of player contracts occur, a 
fact that is difficult to explain in purely economic terms, since there is no 
N FL rule outlawing such sales. The absence of data on sales prices of 
player contracts adds to the ambiguity on valuation of the intangible assets 
of a team. In fact, when a dispute arises between the IRS and a team 
concerning the proper value to assign to player contracts, the allowable 
figure is apparently arrived at by a series of compromises. Okner ( 3 
reports that for most teams, between 70 and 90 percent of the purchase 
price is allocated to player contracts. 
We next turn to the model of valuation of a sports team. 
D IS COUN T E D  P R ES EN T  VALU E O F  A SPOR TS TEAM 
Let P 
c 
F 
the price of a sports team, 
the value assigned to the player contracts held by 
the· team, 
the value assigned to the "franchise, 11 that is, to 
the non-deprecia..ble intangible assets of the team 
together with the tangible assets of team. 
Hence, P = C + F. 
It is assumed that the team will .be operated as a "Subchapter S"
corporation, a common practice in professional sports. Subchapter S 
corporations have the characteristic that corporate income may be mixed with 
the income of the owner of the corporation for tax purposes, while maintaining 
limited liability so far as the creditors of the corporation are concerned. 
Let R t 
a 
'I' 
s 
net revenue before taxes for the team in year t, 
marginal tax rate of the owner of the team, 
period over which player contracts are depreciated, 
sales price of the team at the time the new owner 
disposes of the team. 
I. Ownership in Perpetuity 
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Consider first the case where the new owner buys the team at 
time zero, intending to hold it in perpetuity. The discounted present 
value DPV of after tax income from ownership of the team at time zero 
is given by the following expression. 
DPV 
T Rt - a (Rt - C/ T) :L t t=l II (1 + d.) 
j =l J 
+ 
oo R (1 - a ):L _
t
_;.t __ _ 
t=T+l II (1 + d.) 
j=l J 
is the discount rate appropriate for year j. where d., j = 1, 2, • . •  , J 
The formula may be interpreted as follows. IRS rules specify 
that only straight line depreciation can be applied to depreciable intangible 
assets - - accelerated depreciation is not permitted. Hence C/ T represents 
annual depreciation of playing contracts during the first T years of ownership. 
Rt - C/ T is then income of the team subject to taxes, and Rt - a (Rt - C/ T)
is income after taxes, for t = 1, 2, . . .  , T. Once the playing contracts are 
fully depreciated, then income after taxes from the team is simply 
Rt ( l  - a). This holds for t = T + l, • , . ,
Certain comments are in order concerning the DPV formula. 
Fi.rst, for the typical sports team, Rt - C/ T is negative, so that the 
team shows a book loss on its operations. This means that the owner 
is able to reduce his taxable income derived from other earnings by this 
book loss, and achieves a tax savings of a (R - C/T). He is only able . t 
to take advantage of all of this tax savings if his income from other 
sources is at least - (Rt - C/ T). Hence the formula applies in the 
form shown only for individuals with large amounts of income earned 
outside sports. 
Second, the discount rate d. is to be interpreted as the J 
maximum after tax rate of return available to the owner for the jth 
year on investments of riskiness comparable to that of the sports team. 
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To indicate the importance of the tax writeoffs on the discounted 
present value of a sports team, consider the case in which net revenue 
is expected to be constant over time, so that Rt = R for every t, and 
the discount rates d. are constant over time, with d. = d for every j. J J 
Let i denote the maximum before tax rate of return on investments 
comparable in risk to the sports team. Then d = (1 - a)i. 
DPV 
The DPV formula can then be solved to obtain 
{R - a ( R  - C/T)} r� (l - l T)l + R (l - a l l TJ � \ ( 1 + d) j Ld (  1 + d) 
If no depreciation of playing contracts were perinitted, then 
DPV reduces to 
with 
'� 
DPV R(l - a) d 
R 
For example, take a = . 7, the maximum marginal tax rate, 
= • 33, so that d = . 10. Assume that T = 5 and that C = $8, 450, 000. * 
Okner ( 3 ) points out that for most sports teams, contracts are 
depreciated over a period of from 5 to 7 years. The authors have 
examined the records of three teams, with writeoff periods of 5 -1/4 years 
(football), 3-3/4 )'ears {basketball) and 4 years (baseball). Hence T = 5 is a reasonable writeoff period. Further, the tax benefits from ownership 
are so important that only the rare owner will not be in the maximum 
tax bracket. 
DPV when no depreciation occurs is $3, 000, 000, and DPV ls 
$7, 483, 000 when depreciation occurs. The cash flows for these 
two cases are the following. 
Cash Flows 
with depreciation of $8, 450, 000 
of player contracts 
without depreciation 
of player contracts 
Year Income Taxes Cash Flow Income Taxes Cash Flow 
$1, 000, 000 -$483, 000 $1, 483, 000 $1, 000, 000 $700, 000 $300, 000 
2 1, 000, 000 - 483, 000 1, 483, 000 1, 000,000 700, 000 300, 000 
3 1, 000, 000 - 483, 000 1, 483, 000 1, 000, 000 700, 000 300,000 
4 1, 000, 000 - 483, 000 1, 483,000 1, 000, 000 700, 000 300, 000 
5 1, 000, 000 - 483, 000 1, 483, 000 1, 000, 000 700, 000 300, 000 
6££. 1, 000, 000 700, 000 300,000 1, 000, 000 700, 000 300, 000 
Depreciation of the player contracts permits the owner to 
increase his cash flow from ownership of the team by $1, 183, 000 per 
year for each of the first five years of ownership. Discounted back to 
the present at 10 percent, this accounts for the $4, 483, 000 increase 
in DPV over the situation in which no depreciation is permitted. Note 
that the existence or non-existence of the depreciation allowance has 
no effect on the net revenue (inco me) of the team, since costs of 
actually replacing players are identical in either case. 
Now admittedly, we have considered a very special case thus 
far in the sense that the owner is assumed to hold the team forever, 
hence he is never subject to capital gains tax when the team is sold. 
We next generalize the model to consider this complication. 
I I. Ownership and Later Sale of a Team 
Assume that the team is held for T'' years, at which time it 
is sold for a price of S dollars. The appropriate DPV formula becomes 
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DPV 
for T* � T 
DPV 
for T* > T 
T�'R - a (R L: t t t t=l n (1 + 
j=l 
- C/ T) 
d.) J 
+ 
T Rt - a (Rt - C/ T)L: t + t=l n (1 + d.) 
+ 
j =l J 
S - . 36 (S - (P - C)] 
T* n (1 + d.) 
j =l J 
s -
T* 
n (1 + d.) 
j=l J 
T* Rt ( l  - a) L: -t-=---t=T +l n (1 + d.) 
j=l J 
In the above formulation, the capital gains tax rate is taken
to be . 36. Okner ( 3 ) indicates that the effective capital gains tax
rate will range between • 32 and . 36 for individuals engaged in selling 
sports teams, so that the formulas assume the upper limit so far as 
capital gains taxes are concerned. In addition, it is assumed that there 
is no recapture of excess depreciation, either because of the value 
assigned to player contracts at time of sale, or because all the playing 
contracts involved in the original purchase of the club have since been 
disposed of, and replacement players were signed without bonuses. 
DPV is shown both for the case where the team is sold before 
the player contracts are completely depreciated and for the case where 
the contracts are completely written off before time of sale . The only 
new element introduced into the DPV calculation is the sale of the team 
and the consequent truncation of the flow of cash from ownership of the 
team. 
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At time of sale T*, the owner receives S dollars and pays 
capital gains taxes, at an assumed 36 percent rate, on the difference 
between the sales price S and the cost basis of the team. That cost 
basis ("book value") in tµrn is equal to the ·original purchase price P 
less accumulated depreciation of player contracts, namely C ( T�</ T) 
for T�' ::=:; T, or C if T* > T. 
THE VALUE O F  A SP OR TS T EAM 
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The econo1nist1s theory of asset values argues that assets 
should sell for their discounted present values. However, this presumes 
that an asset is purchased only for the time· stream of income that the 
asset provides. In the case of a sports team, there are other factors 
at w ork. For certain owners, heading a sports team is viewed as a 
consiimer good in and of itself; for others, the publicity and prestige 
associated with ownership is of importance. We should expect then that 
the market price of a sports team will exceed the discounted present 
value of the after tax income generated by the team. Unfortunately, 
there is no obvious way of incorporating this non-financial aspect of 
ownership into the valuation of a team. The approach that will be taken 
here is to ignore such non-financial matters and as a first approximation 
assume that the team in fact sells on the basis of DPV; it is then possible 
to make comparisons between such calculated values and actual m arket 
prices of teams to arrive at some idea as to the importance of the non­
financial aspects of ownership. 
But even when we restrict ourselves to DPV as a measure of 
the value of a team, it is obvious from the above formulas that DPV 
itself will vary depending on the time that the team is sold. We will in 
fact consider in detail two extreme cases: (1) the case where the team 
is held in perpetuity by the owner ( T* = co) ;  (2) the case where the team 
is sold as soon as the tax advantages of ownership are exhausted ( T* = T), 
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There is one further qualification to the rule of equating DPV 
with price that should be noted, One alternative that is always available 
i:o a team owner (except perhaps in the N FL) is to sell the player contracts 
owned by the team to the other teams in the league. Hence the price of 
a team can never be less than the market value of such contracts . In 
fact, more generally, the allocation of the purchase price to player 
contracts C must itself always be at least as large as the market value of the 
contracts, since such an allocation presumably can always be justified to the 
IRS. Let M denote the market value of the player contracts, and let 
a, 0 � a � 1, denote the fraction of the purchase price that is allocated 
to player contracts, Then P � M; in fact, C = aP ;;;_ M. (Note that a 
is not necessarily a constant; instead, a might well be a function of P 
or of M. ) 
Turning first to the case of ownership in perpetuity, equating 
DPV to P, subject to the qualifications noted, gives 
p 
�Rt - a(Rt - �) 
L, t + t=l n (l + d.) 
j =l J 
co 
R (1 
:L _t _t t=T+l TI ( l  
j =l 
- a) 
+ d.) J 
Solving for P, we obtain 
p I I co T 'I\ Rt (l  - a) 
1 - �z;.. t I ) ti A ( 1 + d.) I T V- 1 .n ( l + d. } j=l J J =l J 
In the special case where d. 
J 
d for all R for 
all t, the formula reduces to 
Assume that d = • 1, a = • 7, R =· $1, 000, 000 and T = 5, 
as in the earlier example. The table below shows the dependence of 
p on a, that is, on the fraction of the purchase price that is allocated 
to player contracts. 
� p � p 
0 $3, 000, 000 • 5 $4, 084, 200 
• 1 3, 168, 000 • 6 4, 402, 500 
• 2 3, 356, 400 . 7  4, 7 74, 500 
. 3  3, 568,200 • 8 5, 215, 500 
• 4 3, 808, 800 . 9 5, 745,900 
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To illustrate why the value of the team increases as a increases, 
consider the cash flows associated with a few values of a, 
a 0, p 
Years 1 - 5 
Years 6 f£. 
a • 5, .P
Years 1 - 5 
Years 6 ff. 
$3, 000, 000, c = 0 
Net Revenue/Year 
$1, 000, 000. 
$1, 000,000 
Taxes/Year 
$ 700,000 
$700,000 
$4, 084,200, c = $2, 04� 100 
Net Revenue/Year 
$1, 000, 000 
$1, 000, 000 
Taxes/Year 
$414, 100 
$ 700, 000 
Cash Flow/Year 
$300,000 
$300, 000 
Cash Flow/Year 
$585,900 
$300, 000 
a .9, p 
Years 1 - 5 
Years 6 ff. 
$5, 745, 900, c = $5, 171, 400 
Net Revenue/Year 
$1, 000, 000 
$1,000,000 
Taxes/Year 
-$24,000 
$700,000 
Cash Flow /Year 
$1,024, 000 
$300,000 
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The $ 724, 000 additional cash flow per year (for the first five 
years) when discounted back to the present, accounts for the $2, 745, 900 
increase in value of the team when a is increased from 0 percent to 
90 percent, assuming the team is owned in perpetuity. This represents 
an increase in value of some 92 percent, due solely to the special tax 
advantages associated with player contract w riteoffs. 
The situation is even more pronounced when we turn to the 
cas e where the team is sold at the time the tax advantages are exhausted. 
Setting C = aP, the formula for P. becomes 
p �Rt t
- a {Rt - �T
p
\ 
+ §_:.._:_::..:1-=----__,-=---- =-J_ ,L,,, l f . 36 S - (P - aP) t =l n (1 + d.) � (1 + d.) 
j =l J j =l J 
Solving for P, we have 
T R (1 
L t t 
- a) . 64 S p + � (1 . 36(1 - a) t= 1 n ( 1 + d.) 1 - �I 
k(l j=l 
J j=l t + d.) d.) =l n ( 1 + 
j=l J j=l J 
In particular, consider the special case where net revenues 
and discount rates are constant over time so that Rt = R for every t 
and d. = d for every j. Then the ungainly formula above reduces to 
J 
+ d.) J 
p aa(i _ l - Td
\ (1 + 
. 36(1 - a) l.i:R(l - a) 
(1 + d) T 
t=l(l + d)t 
+ 
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The sales value S is the complicating factor in this expression. 
Presumably S will be equal to the DPV of the time stream of income 
beginning in year T + l ;  but this in turn depends on the time at which 
that new owner sells, what sales price he can obtain, and the new 
owner 1 s marginal tax bracket. The simplest case to consider is one 
i n  which each succeeding owner holds the team for T years, and has 
the same inarginal tax rate a, so that S = P. This permits a further 
simplification of the expression for P to the following 
p R(l -a)[(l + �)
T - 1) 
dJ( l  T7 aa) aa + d) \1 - Td + Td - l + . 36af 
To return to our overworked example, let d = • 1, a = • 7, 
R = $1, 000, 000 and T = 5. The table below gives the relationship 
between P and a. 
� p � p 
0 $3,000,000 . 5 $5, 041, 300 
. 1 3,264. 300 .6 5,835,400 
. 2  3,579, 800 .7 6, 926, 500 
• 3 3, 962, 700 • 8 8,519,500 
• 4 4, 437; 400 .9 11,064,000 
Cash flows associated with various va.lues of a are the following. 
a = 0, P $3, 000, 000, c = 0 
Net Revenue/Year Taxes/Year 
Years l - 5 $1,000,000 $700,000 
Sale in year 5 
a • 5, p $5,041, 300, c = $2,520,650 
Years 1 - 5 
Sale in year 5 
Net Revenue/Year 
$1,000,000 
Taxes/Year 
$347, 100 
$907,434 
a . 9, p $11,064,000, c = $9,957, 600 
Years 1 - 5 
Sale in year 5 
Net Revenue/Year 
$1, 000, 000 
Taxes/Year 
-$394,050 
$3,584,736 
Cash Flow/Year 
$300,000 
Cash Flow/Year 
$652,900 
-$907,434 
Cash Flow/Year 
$1, 394,050 
-$3,584,736 
With a = 0, sale of the team for $3, 000, 000 in year 5 involves 
no capital gains taxes, so that the owner instead receives $300, 000 
after taxes per y ear, giving him a 10 percent return on his investment. 
With a = • 9, the value of the team increases $8, 064, 000, since with 
depreciation of player contracts, there is an increase in cash flow per 
year during the period of ownership by over $1 million. A part of this 
is recovered in the $3, 584, 736 of capital gains taxes at time of sale, of
.course. But the fact that tax savings are available to each successive 
owner, operating the team for T years, boosts the price of the team to 
$11, 064, 000. 
The assumption that the team can be sold in T years at the 
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current price, under stationary revenues and discount rates, unquestionably 
overstates the value of the team. Certainly there will be a higher riskiness 
associated with the sales price than with net revenue, since that sales 
price depends in turn on expectations into the more distant future. Hence 
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it undoubtedly would be more realistic to associate a higher discount 
rate with the expected sales price than that shown in order to reflect 
this higher riskiness. We will not make that adjustment here, and 
instead will regard the expression above relating P to the various 
parameters of the valuation process, as an upper bound on the market 
price, assuming stationary revenues and ·discount rates, and of course 
>:< 
ignoring the non-financial payoffs from team ownership. 
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The importance of the assmnption that no recapture of excess 
depreciation occurs should also be emphasized. If all excess depreciation 
were in fact captured, then the formula for P in the resale. case becomes 
p R 1 - a) 1 + d) 
T -
aa aa I - dT + dT - 1 +aa \
(the last term in the denominator changes from • 36a to aa when recapture 
occurs). For a =  , 7, a = , 9, T = 5, R = $1, 000, 000, the value of the 
team is $3, 880, 000.with complete recapture versus $11, 064, 000 when 
there is no recapture. In effect, with complete recapture the only gain to 
the owner is the interest earned by delaying his tax payments T years into 
the future, that is, until the time when sale of the team takes place, 
What can be concluded from this exercise? First, the 
importance of the tax advantage involved in the depreciating of player 
contracts on the value of a team is quite apparent, whether a team 
sells on the basis of ownership in perpetuity or on the basis of resale 
once the tax .advantages are exhausted. The quantitative m agnitudes 
are of course quite sensitive to the parameter values chosen. But 
under "reasonable" choices for those parameter values, as in the 
examples, a team is worth almost twice as much to.an owner buying 
for holding in perpetuity when he can assign 90 percent of the purchase 
pri ce to contracts than when no depreciation is permitted. And the 
team is worth 3-2/3 times as much in the "upper bound" resale case. 
Second, these results become even more striking the lower is the 
discount rate and the shorter is the time period over which contracts 
are depreciated, as is clear from the formulas. 
One point should be emphasized, It is not being argued here 
that tax advantages from ownership provide bonanzas for high income 
individuals who buy sports teams. In fact, the approach of this paper 
is one in which all such advantages are assumed to be capitalized into 
the prices at which sports teams are sold. 1£ wealthy individuals can 
earn 10 percent (after taxes) in investments in other industries, it is 
assumed that what they will earn in sports is 10 percent (after taxes) 
as well, The gains from the tax advantage accrue instead. to those 
owners who bought in before the tax advantages existed or before the 
16' 
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advantages were widely enough recognized so that they were capitalized. 
in the prices of teams. And gains also accrue to existing owners in 
a sports league when expansion franchises are created and sold; such 
existing owners· share equally in expansion fees which in turn .presumably 
are set at levels that reflect the tax advantages of ownership. 
A comment is in order concerning the discount rate(s) 
appropriate for investment in a professional sports team. A rate of 
return (after taxes) of 10 percent might seem high, given that an individual 
in the 70 percent tax bracket would have to earn 33 percent before taxes 
in order to make 10 percent after taxes, in the absence of special tax 
advantages. But a sports team must be regarded as a highly risky 
investment - - in part because income depends cin monopoly control of 
the sport, since emergence of competitive leagues can erode profitability 
quite rapidly, as in the case of the ABA and WHA, by transferring rents 
from owners to players. Sports is a risky investment as well because 
the value of a sports team rests in large part on an ad1ninistrative ruling 
from the IRS which is subject to somewhat unpredictable changes. For 
this last reason in particular the discount rate appropriate for sports 
teams is certainly higher than the variability of net revenue from changes 
in attendance and costs might indicate. 
QUALIFICATIONS TO THE DPV FORMULAS 
F inally, some comments are in order concerning the purely 
mathematical properties of the formulas derived above for P, both 
in the case of holding in perpetuity and in the case where resale takes 
place after the tax advantages are exhausted. Strictly speaking these 
formulas hold under stationary conditions only when R � O; when there 
is sufficient outside income so that the book losses of the team can be 
applied in total to other taxable income of the owner; and when P, as 
calculated, satisfies aP � M; and when there is no recapture of excess 
depreciation. But there is the further issue ·of whether. the operation 
of solving for P involves a mathematical absurdity. Consider first 
the case of ownership in perpetuity, where 
p aa h l - dT\ 
l 
� R(l; a )
(1 + d)Tj 
aa � 1 ) Let f(d) = 1 - dT 1 - T • Then the expression for P holds (1 + d) 
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only if f(d) > 0. To see that this condition is in fact satisfied, note that 
f'(d) = _aa ffi - 1 �l-2) + _!_(T(l + d)T - 1)� T l\ (1 + d)Tj\d 2 d (1 + d)ZT � 
aa r I · 1 T J -dT [d + d(l + d)T + (1 + d?+l 
-�a f_ 1 + _!___± 
d T L (I 
(T + l)d] 
+ d?+1 
Since (1 + d) T+l = 1 + (T + l)d + other positive terms, the 
expression in brackets is negative, hence f'(d) > 0 for d > O.
lim 
d-+O 
Further, by L'Hospital's rule, 
l Ii 1 ) 
dT \ - (1 + d)T 
T(l + d)T-1 
(1 + d)ZT 
T ( l  + d?+1 
Consequently, 
lim 
d->O 
since 0 £: a < 1, 0 £: a £: 1. Hence f(d) > 0 for d > 0. 
The interpretation to be given to this result is that if a team 
is to be held in perpetuity after purchase, and if, under stationary 
conditions, R £: 0, then any purchase price above the market value 
of the player contracts held by the team can be justified only by the 
non-financial payoffs associated with ownership of the team. 
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The situation is more complicated when the team is purchas�d 
for resale after the tax advantages are exhausted. Under stationary 
conditions, and assuming the selling price S = P, the original purchase 
price, the expression for P is given by 
where 
Then 
g(d) 
Hm 
d->0 
P g(d)R( l - a) 
( 1 + d) T - 1 
(1 + d)T(d - a;) + a; - d + . 36ad 
g(d) T 
( 6 ) 
:::; 0 
• 3 - a a for a �. 36 
Thus for sufficiently low values of d, g(d) :5 0 so long as the 
ordinary income tax rate is at least as high as the capital gains tax, 
which is always the case of course. When g(d) :::; 0 then t he formula 
relating P to R can be interpreted as follows. 
1£ R ::'.:· 0, then any prospective owner would be willing to pay 
any positive price P for the team, P being limited only by the 
availability of outside income against which the book losses of the 
team could be used to reduce the owner's tax liability. 
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If R � O, then for any given positive P, the formula permits 
one to calculate the largest loss such that the owner still earns d percent 
or more on his investment. 
To illustrate, suppose d .1, a =  . 7, T l. Then 
• 1 g(d) 
( 1. I)(. I - . 7 a) + • 7 a - • I + • 0 36a 
< 0 _> 10 Hence g(d) _ for a 34• 
In particular, take a = • 5. Suppose R 
price P, the cash flow of the owner is given by 
Year 1 
Sale at end of year I 
Net Revenue 
0 -. 35P 
• IBP 
. 1 
. 01 - • 034 a 
0. Th.en at any 
Cash Flow 
+. 35P 
-. 18P 
Thus for any price P, the owner earns 17 percent on his 
purchase price, hence with d = 10 percent, he is willing t,; invest 
any amount in the team, up to the iimits imposed by his outside income 
available for tax shelter. 
If the owner pays $1, 000, 000 for the team, given the same 
values for d, a, T and a, then this price is consistent with a ten 
percent rate of return if the loss of the team is $233, 333 as illustrated 
below. 
Net Revenue 
Year l -$233, 333 
Sale at end of year l 
Taxes 
-$513, 333 
$180,000 
Cash Flow 
+$280, 000 
-$180, 000 
Thus the team yields a cash flow of $100, 000 or a 10 percent
rate of return, For smaller losses, the rate of return exceeds 10 
percent of course. 
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Admittedly, the case g{d) $: 0 must be regarded as somewhat 
exceptional. For d = . 1, a =  • 7, a = . 9, then g{d) � 0 only if T � 3. 
Nonetheless it is not precluded as a possibility, arid when this case 
occurs, even teams promising large losses over the future become 
profitable investments for sufficiently wealthy individuals, assuming 
that such in<lividuals can unload the teams at original purchase prices 
once the tax advantages are exhausted, 
DATA ON VALUES OF FRANCHISES 
In a recent study { 1 ) the authors compiled a history of 
franchise prices for the major professional sports leagues. Data used 
in the study came mainly from published reports in the New York Times 
and Sporting News, supplemented by contacts with teams and leagues. 
Because sports teams typically are closely held corporations, data on 
financial operations {including the prices at which teams are sold) are 
somewhat suspect, being based on the educated guesses of sportswriters. 
For many transactions, no values coUld be obtained. Finally, even when 
dollar amounts are known to be accurate, the terms under .which payment 
is to be made are often not known, and such · terms can have an important 
effect on the cash equivalent prices of franchises. With these qualifications, 
the following table summa.rizes franchise values for the four major 
professional team sports over the recent past. 
Franchise Values, 1950-1974'' 
{Thousands of Dollars) 
Basketball {NBA) 
Average Sales Price 
Average Expansion Price 
Baseball 
Average Sales Price 
Average Expansion Price 
Football (NFL-AFL) 
Average Sales Price 
Average Expansion Price 
1950-
1954 
- --
---
(6) 
$2, 957 
---
(1) 
$600 
-- -
1955-
1959 
(2) 
$18 7.5 
- - -
(3) 
$4,820 
- - -
- --
- - -
1960-
1964 
(2) 
$975 
- --
(4) 
$6, 984 
(4) 
$2, 201 
(5) 
1965-
1969 
{3) 
$3, 867 
(5) 
$1, 820 
(3) 
$8, 617 
(4) 
$7, 788 
(3) 
$3, 632 $13, 555 
(2) (4) 
$600 $ 7, 938 
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1970-
1974 
(3) 
$4,900 
(4) 
$4,313 
(5) 
$10,358 
(2) 
$19,000 
(2) 
$16,000 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to the nmnber of observations in the 
given time period. ) 
Source: Davis, L. and Quirk, J., " The Ownership and Valuation of 
Sports Franchises, " rnirn.eo. ( Cal ifornla Institute of Technology, 
1974). 
*
Hockey has been excluded from the table due to inadequate data. 
By way of contrast, scattered data on net income before 
taxes of sports teams are shown below. 
Net Income before Taxes (Excluding Contract Writeoffs) 
per Team, Selected Years 
Avg. per year 
1952-56* 
Basketball (NBA) -$2, 000 
Baseball (AL- NL) +$13 7, 000 
AL +$194, 600 
NL +$ 79, 100 
Football (N FL) +$69, 000 
Noll 
estimates** 
-$31, 000 
+$273, 000 
n.a. 
n.a. 
+$1, 420,000 
(1971) 
(1969) 
( 19 70) 
*organized Profess ional Team Sports, House Comm ittee 
on the Judiciary (1957). 
** Government and the Sports Business, R. Noll, editor 
(Brook ings, 19 74). Estimates shown are for "average " teams. 
The most striking feature of the data on team values is the 
rap id rate of increase in such values in all three sports, both for 
established teams and for expansion teams. At least so far as 
established teams are concerned, the rise in team values reflects 
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in part the fact that in the early years of the table, teams losing money 
tended to be sold more often than profitable teams. But of overriding 
importance, of course, is the increase in public interest in professional 
sports as reflected in higher attendance and TV revenues in all sports. 
Beyond this, from 1960 on , the special tax advantages discussed 
above became available to owners. 
The profit data offer an interesting contrast to the data on 
team values. Except perhaps for the case of football, profits do not 
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show the increases that would generate the rapid rises in team prices 
shown in the first table. Hence it must be concluded that other factors 
are at ·work in inflat ing the values of sports teams. The most obv ious 
candidates are (1) an increase in the prestige value of ownersh ip of 
a sports team; (2) the change in the tax status of team ownership; 
(3) a lowering of the discount rate applicable to the earnings of sports 
teams, due, say, to a decrease in the riskiness of sports as an 
investment. These three factors are not unrelated, and undoubtedly 
all have played parts in increasing the prices of sports teams. 
Some general co mments can be made concerning the current 
situation relative to team values in the three sports. First, the "average " 
NBA team is ·probably bought to be resold. As a financ ial investment, 
ownership in perpetu ity of a team is only justified at a positive price if 
earn ings (net revenues) are expected to be posit ive, or. if the price 
just covers the market value of the player contracts. With the average 
NBA team having negative net revenues, current prices of NB A 
franch ises must reflect e ither purchase for resale or an important 
ingred ient of prestige value. 
In particular, in the 19 70 NB A expansion when Buffalo, Portland 
and Cleveland were admitted to the league, the expansion price was 
$3. 7 million per team. The terms were $1. 5 mill ion in cash, with 
$550, 000 paid each year for the next four years. Assuming a discount 
rate of 8 percent, the cash equivalent value is roughly $3. 32 million: 
Suppose that a typical expansion franchise will earn the average net 
revenue of an NB A team of -$31, 000 pe·r year, that · a = • 8, T ':' 4; 
and a = • 7. Then the rate of return that equates DPV to the price of 
$3. 32 million, assuming resale at$ 3. 32 million when tax advantages 
are exhausted, can be derived from the forn1ula for P above to obtain 
d = • 066. In other words, an expansion franchise expected to perform 
l ike an average NBA team w.ould be a good investment for resale in 
four years if the best after tax rate of retul'.n on assets of comparable 
riskiness outside of sports was 6. 6 perc·ent. Such a low rate of 
return under the most favorable conditions so far as tax sheltering 
is c.oncerned seems to indicate a large measure of "prestige" value 
to ownership of an NBA expansion franchise. 
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In connection with this, it might be mentioned that of the three 
sports, the rate of turnover of franchises is greatest in basketball. 
Since 1 960, Atlanta has been sold twice; Baltimore once; Boston 
three times; Chicago once; Golden States once; Houston twice; 
Kansas City-Omaha once; Los Angeles once; Philadelphia once. 
With net revenue of $273, 000 per year, the "average" 
baseball team would command a positive price even if bought for 
holding in perpetuity, as a financial investment. At a 10 percent 
rate of discount, with a = • 8, a = • 7 and T = 5, the price for an 
average baseball team held in perpetuity would be $1,  564, 000. In 
1 967, the last expansion of baseball occurred, with the AL adding 
Kansas City and Seattle with expansion fees of $5, 300, 000 each, while 
the NL added San Diego and Montreal at $ 10, 000, 000 each. Terms 
of these sales were not available to the authors, but for concreteness .• 
assume that they were roughly the same as those in the 1970 NBA 
expansion. At an 8 percent discount rate, the cash equivalent values 
of the AL and NL expansion teams were $4. 76 million (AL), $8. 97 
million (NL). The rate of return for holding in perpetuity that equates 
the DPV to the average of these prices, assuming expansion teams 
earn average profits of $273, 000 per year, is approximately 2. l percent. 
Clearly either the teams were bought to be resold, or the prestige value 
of a baseball franchise is high indeed. Under the resale assumption, 
the rate of return that equates DPV to price is approximately 5. 3 percent. 
Baseball teams sold since 1960 include Atlanta, Chicago White Sox (twice), 
Cincinnati Reds (twice), Cleveland Indians (twice), Seattle, New York 
Yankees (twice), Kansas City Athletics, San Diego, and Washington­
Texas (three times), 
Finally, there is the real success story, pro football. In 
1974, the Tampa and Seattle expansion franchises were sold for 
$ 1 6  million each. Terms of these sales have not been announced. 
Again, using the NBA 1970 expansion as a guide, the cash equivalent 
(at 8 percent discount) is $ 14. 35 million. Recently, the NFL owners 
provided a public statement of net revenue per average team which is 
claimed to be $945, 000 per year, considerably below Noll's estimate. 
Using the ownership in perpetuity assumption together with a five 
26 
year writeoff, a = • 7, a = • 8, the rate of return to the new owners, 
assuming they experience average results for the NFL, is 4 percent. 
I£ they resell after five years, the rate of return is 8. 3 percent, again 
assuming that the team is resold at the purchase price. Football 
teams sold since 1 960 include the Baltimore Colts, Cleveland Browns, 
Detroit Lions, Los Angeles Rams, New York Titans- Jets (twice), 
Philadelphia Eagles (three times), San Diego Chargers. 
SUMMARY 
Market prices for sports teams clearly are influenced by 
non-financial factors; the rates of return that can be earned utilizing 
all tax advantages of ownership still appear to be too low to justify the 
ownership of a team in any league as a purely financial matter. 
Nonetheless, those tax advantages are not at all trivial in terms of 
their impact on returns from ownership of a sports tean•. Sports 
teams prices would certainly be affected in a very damaging way if 
the rules of the IRS were changed either to eliminate the depreciation 
of playing contracts or to provide for effective recovery of excess 
depreciation at time of sale of a team. Under the present tax laws, 
only an individual in the 70 percent tax bracket could reasonably 
consider purchase of a team; and if the profit data used in this paper 
is at all close to the true net revenues of sports tean1s, the rate of 
return such a wealthy individual will earn is certainly less than 
could be earned in less risky tax shelters such as mediu m grade 
municipal bonds. 
It should be e mphasized that the approach of this paper has 
been very much centered on "steady state" analysis, even though 
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the formulas presented apply as well to changing patterns of revenues 
and riskiness. This is i mportant, because in the face of the low rates 
of return after taxes fro m current operations of sports tea ms, team 
prices have continued to climb rapidly over the past twenty-five Y.ears. 
Investors in sports teams have in fact earned high rates of returns 
on their invest ments because of this rise in team prices, rather than 
because of the after tax income fro m running the teams themselves. 
Perhaps the appropriate model for explaining rising tea m prices is 
more appropriately the model of the various speculative "bubbles" 
of the eighteenth century rather than the econo mist's model of as.set 
valuation based on income strea ms. What can .be concluded is that 
rates of return from operating teams, even including the tax advantages, 
.
leave a substantial portion of tea m valuation unexplained. 
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